The Appellate Court View of the Juvenile Court by Parker, Graham
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 7, Number 2 (January 1970) Article 2
The Appellate Court View of the Juvenile Court
Graham Parker
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Parker, Graham. "The Appellate Court View of the Juvenile Court." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 7.2 (1970) : 155-175.
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol7/iss2/2
The Appellate Court View of the Juvenile Court
Abstract
The juvenile court has had several distinct phases in its seventy years of existence. The court was founded on a
curious Victorian mixture of sentiment("child-saving"), seemingly sound political economy ("if we save the
little rascals from their environment, it will be the end of vice, spiritous liquors,crime and degradation") and
hard-headed reform.' Although it is not always obvious in the reform literature, which is rather tear-stained,
the last named factor is the most important. The radical reformers of the nineteenth century had been working
in what might be called the juvenile court movement for many years before the court was itself established.
Hard-headed reform resulted in a century of saving children from the thief 's gallows, the agonies of chimney-
sweeping, or working in coal mines and factories, and the temptations of the gin palaces and other dens of
vice.
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THE APPELLATE COURT VIEW OF THE
JUVENILE COURT
GRAHAM PARKER*
The juvenile court has had several distinct phases in its seventy years of
existence. The court was founded on a curious Victorian mixture of sentiment("child-saving"), seemingly sound political economy ("if we save the little
rascals from their environment, it will be the end of vice, spiritous liquors,
crime and degradation") and hard-headed reform.' Although it is not always
obvious in the reform literature, which is rather tear-stained, the last named
factor is the most important. The radical reformers of the nineteenth century
had been working in what might be called the juvenile court movement for
many years before the court was itself established. Hard-headed reform
resulted in a century of saving children from the thief's gallows, the agonies of
chimney-sweeping, or working in coal mines and factories, and the temptations
of the gin palaces and other dens of vice.
The opening of a new form of court was a convenient, and even dramatic,
expression of an idea - if children could be protected from these evils listed
above and could be raised in segregated orphan asylums, juvenile reforma-
tories and truant schools, then the final gesture for the child-savers was the
establishment of a separate tribunal. This new agency was not really a court,
although it seemed to be a credible facsimile and it certainly was separate from
the detention cells of hardened criminals and was a place of loving under-
standing rather than one of brutal retribution. The juvenile court, whatever
its eventual shortcomings, was an important experiment; it served as a
laboratory for the emerging welfare state, and a place where the rehabilitative
ideal was practised. As we all know, the use of probation, suspended sentences
and humane penology spread, in time, to the adult jurisdiction.
The ambivalent quality of this tribunal in being a partly legal and a
partly social agency soon caused the court to enter another phase in its
history.
In the first decade of the court's existence, there were a few legal battles
fought with irate parents who did not want their children committed to train-
ing schools. These constitutional attacks on the court were unsuccessful; the
appeal courts decided that the paternalistic approach of the specialized court
for children was altogether good and no rights, parental or juvenile, were being
infringed. (One fascinating question arising from the drafting of the Illinois
*Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School of York University.
1 For some of the history of American reform for children, see Parker, American
Child-Saving: The Climate of Reform as Reflected in the National Conference of Chari-
ties and Corrections, 1875-1900 (1968), 18 U OF TORONTO L.3. 371.
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statute was the preoccupation of the reformers with precautions against legal
attacks. At first sight, these safeguards seemed to have been partly inspired
by fear of the corrupt politics of Chicago at the turn of the century, but this
can hardly be the full answer.2)
After it survived these attacks, the court had a relatively unhampered
existence for many years. As the court gained confidence, its auxiliary services
and extra-legal embellishments took on greater importance; unfortunately
these facets of the court work have been unsuccessful, at least in terms of the
expectations of the founders. Probation services were considered to be the
backbone of the court, but the practitioners of the new profession of social
work were not able to produce the extraordinary rehabilitative results expected
of them.
The court's initial twenty years coincided with the first enthusiasm for
psychiatry. The court was disappointed by this means of preventing delin-
quency or saving children. The expectations on both sides were far too high.
Delinquency continued to exist and, in fact, increased.3 Psychiatric clinics
attached to the courts were not established, or maintained, systematically or
with continuity; and the psychiatrists moved on to lucrative private practice,
the greener fields of education or the attempted application of other theories
which were irrelevant to teen-age juvenile delinquents or "middle-aged"
dependent and incorrigible children.
Similarly, the courts attracted the attention of the sociologists and the
practitioners of that hybrid (or perhaps bogus) discipline of criminology. For
a time, juvenile delinquency was a popular form of research but interest was
spasmodic or results were disappointing. The sociologists4 left the field open
to social workers (and some clinical psychologists) who were free to practise
their newly-learned skills of casework and prognosis - but to little avail. The
statistics on delinquency showed no diminution despite probation supervision,
social histories to assist the judges and training schools to reform the
recalcitrant.
Immediately before and after the Second World War, there was wide-
spread disaffection with the juvenile court and the problem of juvenile
delinquency. Surveys, reassessments, royal commissions, departmental
inquiries and Governors' Committees investigated the juvenile court and
juvenile delinquency. 5. The "left-wing" courts of the United States became
2 Compare the history of the juvenile court movement in South Australia which had
separate court in the nineteenth century, see Parker, Some Historical Observations on
the Juvenile Court, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 467.
3 Of course, we must remember that to some extent the juvenile court movement
"invented" delinquency or certainly made it much more visible. See Platt, THE CMLD-
SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY, 1968.
4 As the discipline of sociology developed, its practitioners departed from their
social work brethren's preoccupation with preventive programs, and started theorizing
on the actiology of delinquency.5 e.g. see Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons (1960),
Cmnd. 1191 and Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile
Justice (1960). For comments on these two reports, see Geis: Juvenile Justice: Great
Britain and California, 7 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 111 (1961). See also Juvenile
Delinquency in Canada. The Report of the Department of Justice Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency (1965).
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more conscious of legalistic (or, perhaps one should say, fair) procedures
and the glorified magistrates' courts of Great Britain were urged to be more
sociological, better staffed with social workers and the trappings of behavioral
science. All to little avail - attendance centres, short, sharp shocks, new
training schools, and more intensive probationary care seemed to have little
effect.
In the United States, the Supreme Court decisions in Kent6 and Gault7
have caused a new wave of stock taking and reassessment. The highest court
in the United States tried to legislate procedural morality for that country'sjuvenile courts, and those decisions seemed to fly in the face of the
President's Commission on Crime whose recommendations sounded very
similar to the plaints of the Victorian reformers who wanted social reform and
envisaged it as coming through improved conditions for children. The
President's Commission spoke of:
Efforts, both private and public, should be intensified to:-
Reduce unemployment and devise methods of providing minimum family
income.
Re-examine and revise welfare regulations so that they contribute to keeping
the family together.
Improve housing and recreation facilities.
Insure availability of family planning assistance.
Provide help in problems of domestic management and child care.
Make counselling and therapy easily obtainable.
Develop activities that involve the whole family together.8
Procedural safeguards for juveniles would hardly achieve these results.
The initial aim of this essay was to examine the Canadian juvenile court
through the eyes of the appellate courts in this country. There was no
expectation that the Canadian courts had made major policy statements or in-
depth studies of the court as are found in the judgement of Justice Fortas in
Kent. Nevertheless, an examination of the Canadian cases has been dis-
appointing. In summary, our courts have little conception or only slight
regard for the concept of the juvenile court and the potential importance of its
work.
The juvenile court appeals fall into three rough categories. There are
numerous reported decisions concerning persons convicted of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor. The appeals have usually been decided on narrow
procedural issues and are of no great moment in the present context.
Two issues surrounding the contributing cases do, however, concern us.
First, what is "contributing"? Some of the more unfortunate definitions have
been provided by the superior courts rather than the juvenile courts them-
selves. The act of contributing can range from some stranger perpetrating
a savage sexual assault on a very young child, to cases where the parent has
been discovered swearing or drinking in the actual or constructive presence
6 Kent v United States, (1966) 383 U.S. 541
7 Re the Application of Gault (1967) 384 U.S. 997
8 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME AM LAW ENFORCEMENT: TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, Washington 1967, at 47.
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of the child. The act of contributing is not taken as one which actually causes
or adds to a child's delinquency but simply has a tendency to do so. The
height of absurdity is reached in such cases as Stundon9,• at best, the case is
absurd in its legal reasoning unless we take the view that men should be sent
to jail on the basis of a legal abstraction. In fact, the abstraction is not
altogether the law's fault; the views of the judge in Stundon are based on crude
psychological and sociological concepts. While we quite properly protect
children's rights by segregating them from the rigours of adult criminal courts
and jails, should we go so far as to invade the rights of adults in the name of
protecting children who may not, in fact, be in danger of becoming delinquent
or of being degraded by the acts of the adult?
These is also constant discussion of the advisability of having contributing
cases tried in juvenile courts. There have been few instances in which the
contributing adult's rights have been abused in the juvenile court. Indeed,
most of them have been given more lenient treatment10 in that court than they
would have received in ordinary criminal courts.
The second class of case is one where some procedural irregularity has
resulted in a juvenile's appealing to a higher court. Many of these are based
on notice to parents or the official position of the magistrate concerned. None
of these cases makes a deep analysis of the constitutional issues (if there are
any), and there is little discussion of the procedure which should be followed
in a specialized court for children.
Finally, there are the waiver cases in which the juvenile court judge has
decided that a charge against a child should be transferred to an adult court.
In February 1960 the English newspaper, The Guardian, published a
leading article expressing shock at the proposed hanging of a fourteen-year-old
boy convicted in adult court of a rape-murder. Ironically, the convicted youth,
Steven Truscott, was just a few months over the age at which the law recog-
nized, by irrebuttable presumption, that he was incapable of committing rape.
He was an identical space of seven months over the age when his case
could not, by law", be removed from the juvenile to the adult court.
A book on the Truscott case12 received wide attention. The author was
very critical of the Canadian legal system and particularly of a criminal law
which would allow the trial of a fourteen year old boy to be removed from
juvenile court to the adult jurisdiction.
Acting under Section 9 of the Juvenile Delinquents Act, the juvenile
court judge had decided that "the good of the child and the interest of the
community demand" that Truscott be remanded for preliminary hearing
before the local magistrate (who, in the rural community concerned, also
happened to be the juvenile court judge).
9 Studon, (1962) 40 W.W.R. 565; see comment in Parker, Mens Rea and Contribu-
ting to Juvenile Delinquency, 28 SASK. n. nEV. 78 et seq.
10 e.g. Rex v S., (1946) 87 C.C.C. 154
11 iuvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C., Section 9 (1)
12 Le Bourdais, Tm TRIuL or srmvN TRuscorr, Toronto, 1966.
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In the High Court of Ontario, the appeal judge agreed with the magis-
trate that:
... notwithstanding the publicity and strain of a trial it is my opinion that it
would be for the good of the child to have his position in respect to such a
serious charge established by a jury which would remove any possible criticism
of having such a serious matter determined by a single judge in camera proceed-
ings.
I think it is also in the interests of the community that the public be assured
that in a matter of this kind where public sentiment may have been aroused, the
trial and disposition of the matter shall be in the ordinary course and free from
any criticism.' 3
Mrs. Le Bourdais, who is a layman, was mystified by these legal decisions
because she believed that:
The basic principle of (juvenile court) legislation is that the good of the
child is best served by public anonymity, by treatment of the child as an
individual and by avoidance of public prosecution, conviction, and the stigma
of a criminal record. In theory, at least, the Juvenile Court aims to counsel, to
reform, and to help a delinquent child become a responsible adult.14
A further hearing of the Truscott case was held by the Supreme Court of
Canada after the reprieved murderer had spent six years in juvenile reforma-
tory and adult penitentiary. The Supreme Court did not disturb the original
verdict.
In Kent v. United States,'5 the United States Supreme Court examined
for the first time, the legal structure of the juvenile court. After sixty-seven
years, the highest court in the United States had consented to hear a case in
which the appellant had alleged wrongful treatment at the hands of a juvenile
court.
Unlike Truscott, this was not Kent's first encounter with the juvenile
court. He was the son of a woman who was deserted by her husband when
the boy was two years old. At fourteen years of age, Kent had been
apprehended for a series of housebreakings and an attempted purse snatching.
He was placed on probation after the Social Service Department of the
juvenile court had made an investigation. Two years later, while still on
probation, police discovered Kent's fingerprints in the apartment of a woman
who had been raped by an intruder who also stole her wallet. Kent was
taken into custody and interrogated by police for seven hours. He admitted
his involvement in the rape and volunteered information as to other offences
of housebreaking, robbery and rape.
After the interrogation, Kent was taken to the Receiving Home for
Children; in no other way did the police appear to adhere to the usual
procedures for the handling of juveniles in custody.'6 On the following
13 31 C.R. 76 Cf. for instance, a case cited by Mrs. Le Bourdais, op. cit. at 34, in
which a jury acquitted a fourteen year old of murder. The trial judge McRuer J. said:
"It is inappropriate that young persons under the age of 16 should be tried in ordinary
courts. A tribunal dealing with each individual case should know the alleged delinquents!
innermost story, a practice which cannot be pursued in an ordinary court."
14 Op. cit., at 34
15 86 S. Ct. 1045 (1966)
16 Para I on page 1048.
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morning, the youth's mother retained counsel who conferred with the
Social Service Director of the Juvenile Court and informed that official of his
intention to oppose waiver of the case to the adult court.
Kent was detained at the Receiving Home for a week. During that time,
no arraignment was held and no determination was made by any judicial
officer of "probable cause" for the detention as would be a necessary protec-
tion of an adult's rights. His lawyer had him examined by two psychiatrists
and a psychologist. Their report, which described Kent as "victim of severe
psychopathology" and recommended further observation in a psychiatric
hospital, was filed with the juvenile court. Kent's counsel submitted that the
Juvenile Court should retain jurisdiction over Kent, suggesting that if the
juvenile was given "adequate treatment in a hospital under the aegis of the
Juvenile Court, he would be a suitable subject for rehabilitation.' 7
Kent's counsel applied to the juvenile court for access to its Social Ser-
vice file on his client. He maintained that he needed information from the
file so that he could provide effective representation.
The Juvenile Court judge did not rule on any of these applications. He
held no hearing and did not confer with the boy, his parents or counsel. The
judge ordered that, after "full investigation"' 8 jurisdiction would be waived to
the adult court. In handing down this order, he made no findings and gave
no reasons.
Appeals from this order were unsuccessful. The District Court ruled that
it would not "go behind" the judge's order following a "full investigation".
Kent was subsequently found competent to stand trial' 9 and was
tried on eight charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape. On the two
charges of rape, the jury acquitted Kent by reason of insanity but on the
remaining six counts, he was found guilty.20 This strange verdict meant that
Kent would be sent to a mental institution until his sanity was restored and
then he would start serving the total of thirty to ninety years imposed for the
six convictions for housebreaking and robbery.21
17 Id. at 1049.
18 S.11-914 of the Juvenile Court Act (D.C. Code) provides that:-
"If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an offence which would
amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any child charged with an offence
which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or life imprisonment, thejudge may, after full investigation, waive jurisdiction and order such child held for
trial under the regular procedure of the court which would have jurisdiction of such
offence if committed by an adult: or such other court may exercise the powers con-
ferred upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and disposing of such
cases."
19 See n.8 at 1051 for the psychiatric findings.
2o An explanation of this is given by Justice Fortas in n.10 at 1051-1052: ...
some support in the record, that the jury might find that the robberies had ante-
ceded the rapes, and in that event, it might conclude that the housebreaking and
robberies were not the products of his mental disease or defect, while the rapes
were produced thereby.
21 He was given five to fifteen years on each count to be served consecutively. His
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia failed: 343
F. 2d 247 (1964)
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Before the Supreme Court of the United States, Kent argued that his
detention and interrogation were unlawful, that the police failed to follow the
procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act, that he was deprived of his
liberty for a week without a determination of probable cause, that he was
interrogated by police in the absence of counsel or a parent (and without the
usual caution), that he was fingerprinted which was a violation of the
Juvenile Court legislation.
In all these submissions, Kent was claiming, in effect, that he was not
treated as an adult would have been dealt with by the police and the criminal
courts. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that he wanted to be dealt
with as an adult but rather as a juvenile with the same basic safeguards.
At this point, it might be best to be reminded of the provisions found
in most juvenile court legislation as a philosophy of the court. The original
Illinois Act provided that:-
This act shall be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be carried
out, to wit, the care, custody and discipline of a child shall approximate as nearly
as may be that which should be given by its parents.. 22
The Policy Memorandum of the D. C. Juvenile Court has added a gloss
to these bald, and rather nebulous, policy statements. This Memorandum sets
out the considerations which a juvenile court judge must take into account in
deciding upon waiver. In other words, it lays down the guidelines for a
"full investigation". It states that:
The statute sets forth no specific standards for the exercise of their important
discretionary act, but leaves the formulation of such criteria to the judge.
The criteria laid down include:-
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether
protection of the community requires waiver;
(2) whether the offence was committed in an aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated or wilful manner.
(3) Greater weight will be given to offences against persons, particularly
if personal injury resulted.
(4) "Prosecutive merit". This is qualified as "whether there is evidence
upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment
(to be determined by consultation with the United States Attor-
ney)". (17)
(5) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home environmental situation, emotional atti-
tude and pattern of living.
22 Laws of Illinois 1899, p. 131.
Section 38 of the Canadian Juvenile Delinquents Act, R.S.C 1952 c.160 provides that:-
"This Act shall be liberally construed to the end that its purpose may be carried out,
namely that the care and custody and discipline of a juvenile delinquent shall
approximate as nearly as may be that which should be given by its parents and that
as far as practicable every juvenile delinquent shall be treated, not as criminal but
as a misdirected and misguided child, and one needing encouragement, help and
assistance."
23 Policy Memorandum No. 7, November 30, 1959. This has now been rescinded.
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(6) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions.
(7) The prospectus for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile by the use
of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court.
Justice Fortas' judgment is interesting because it reflects the ambivalence
which the critics and supporters of the juvenile court have felt over the past
sixty years. On the one hand, juveniles' rights should be protected by the
Supreme Court is not prepared to go so far as to say that it should be with
the strictness which has been applied to the "due process of law" guarantees
under the United States Constitution. While the juvenile court is not exactly
a criminal court, it is not a civil court either. While the juvenile court judge
should be given a wide discretion, he must act with some semblance of legalism
so that the rights of juveniles are not abused.
Justice Fortas treated the arguments on behalf of Kent as peculiar to the
case before him. He was interested in the way in which Kent's rights had
been protected, or lacked protection, in this particular instance, although, he
stated the need to discuss "basic issues". The judgment of the Supreme
Court never really amounted to that. Fortas, J. said that the need to discuss
the basic issue of the protection of the juvenile commensurate with safeguards
for adults was particularly relevant where, as in Kent's case, "there is an
absence of any indication that the denial of rights available to adults was off-
set, mitigated or explained by the action of the Government as parens patriae,
evidencing the special solicitude for juveniles commanded by the Juvenile
Court Act".24
'At the outset, it should be made clear that the Supreme Court did not
wish to discuss the merits of the waiver itself. The court also declined the
invitation to rule applicable those "constitutional guarantees which would be
applicable to adults charged with... offences" similar to those committed by
Kent. What, then, is left? The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a
hearing, including access by his counsel to the social record, probation and
other reports upon which the juvenile court presumably relied. Fortas J. based
this finding on the statutory requirements "read in the context of constitutional
principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel". 25 How can
these two statements i.e., evasion of the constitutional issue and a reliance
upon due process be reconciled? Perhaps the answer is that this case takes
us no further in our examination of the juvenile court and any possible
resolution of the problems surrounding it.
24 86 S. Ct. 1045, at 1059-1960.
25 Id at 1052.
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Obviously, the Court, per Fortas J., had serious doubts about the
operation of the Juvenile Court, in the District of Columbia or at least, in the
case of Kent. The opinion written by Fortas J. recognised that most juvenile
courts are "rooted in social welfare philosophy rather than in the corpus
juris".26 The justice went on to describe the role of the juvenile court:
The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged in determining the needs of the
child and of society rather than adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives
are to provide measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and
protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt and punishment.
The State is parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.27
He further observed that the "parental" function of the juvenile court
did not infer an "invitation to procedural arbitrariness".s
Although the hearing may be informal, there must be a hearing at which
the child is entitled to representation by counsel who is allowed to see the
child's social records. "These rights," stated Fortas J., "are meaningless -
an illusion, a mockery - unless counsel is given an opportunity to function. '2 9
He continued: 'The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is
not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the essence of
justice."30 The Supreme Court recognised that proceedings of the juvenile
court are designated as civil rather than criminal. The juvenile court is given
considerable latitude but this is not a complete freedom. "It assumes", said
Fortas J., "procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness as well as compli-
ance with the statutory requirement of a 'full investigation'."
What then is due process in this context? Does it mean as it would seem
to mean, that the judge must act "judicially". He can act in this manner in a
"civil" capacity. This capacity would simply entail a proper regard for the
basic tenets of judicial behaviour and court procedure - the proper reception
of evidence (according to well established rules of law) in open court hearings
by a judge with tenure who gives reasons for judgment and allows each party
to have equal access to all material which may affect his decision. The
criteria of reasons and Kent's counsel's access to court records seems clear
enough. But are they? The administration directives of the D.C. Juvenile
Court do not set out clearly defined procedures which could be described as
embracing due process. At least on a waiver application, no juvenile could
complain that all the relevant factors were not taken into account. The
directive (cited above) makes intelligent guesses hopefully corroborated by
the findings and opinions of social and behavioural scientists so that the best
disposition will be provided for the juvenile. The memorandum recommends
that the treatment and diagnostic personnel must "develop fully all available
information which may bear upon the criteria and factors '3' outlined in the
26 1d at 1054.
27 Id at 1055.
28 Id.
29 Id at 1054.
30 Id.
31 Id at 1060.
1969]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Memorandum. Furthermore, the directive also suggests (it could not be put
any stronger) that "(a) knowledge of the judge's criteria is important to the
child, his parents, his attorney, to the judges (of adult court), to the United
States attorney . . . and to the . . . police . . ., as well as to the staff of this
court, especially the Juvenile Intake Section". 32 This last provision would
suggest that the Supreme Court is simply reinforcing a principal of some
flexibility and uncertainty of which the juvenile court judge is already
apprised.
In the opinion of Fortas J., "there may be grounds for concern that the
child receives the worst of both worlds; that he gets neither the protection
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postu-
lated for children".88
The learned justice prefaced these remarks by exposing the sad fact that
some juvenile courts "lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity".84 This,
unfortunately, is a true assessment of the present state of treatment resources.
Therefore, what remains is the position we faced before except for the
fact that U.S. Supreme Court has discussed the problem. The Court was
faced with the dilemma which has plagued the juvenile court for the past forty
years. What is due process if it is not due process? What is rehabilitation,
"understanding" treatment of a teen-age criminal, and the current theory onjuvenile delinquency and its actiology? No court can answer these but
perhaps the court was a little foolhardy in hoping to solve this problem by
laying down rules in an area where rules are impossible.
In Canada, the Steven Truscott case provided the most important illus-
tration of a waiver case. In trying to look at that case in perspective, what
effect did that case (and the events which occurred ten years after Truscott's
conviction) have on the reputation or "public image" of the juvenile court?
The obvious answer is that the public (or the courts for that matter) gave
little thought to the proper role of the juvenile court. Steven Truscott was one
of the youngest ever transferred to the adult court. The fact that the case
caused so much belated outcry was partly connected with that fact. Isabel Le
Bourdais has explained that she was incensed and horrified by the sentencing
to death of a fourteen year old. The case also accentuated some of the
problems faced by the juvenile court - part-time juvenile court judges, the
difficulties which arise when the juvenile court judge is also the magistrate
who hears the preliminary hearing which he transfers to himself,35 the
difficulties where a crime is committed in a community of low population and
public outrage is running high. The Truscott case is a sad reminder of the
fact that the juvenile court has made very little impact on public opinion, that
32 1d at 1059.
33 id at 1057.
34 Id at 1054.
s5 This should no longer happen under the Provincial Courts Act, which provides forjudicial specialization.
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the philosophy of the juvenile court is not well understood and is probably not
respected. Of course, from a penal point of view the decision to treat a
fourteen-year old as an adult criminal is shocking. Most reviews of Le
Bourdais' book from outside Canada were by reviewers who were relatively
unaffected by the sensation caused in this country but were nevertheless
surprised to find this treatment of Truscott at a time when the humane
disposition of children's cases was more than one hundred years old.
The following is a survey of reported waiver cases, i.e. cases in which an
allegation of juvenile delinquency was to be transferred to the adult court to
be tried as a crime. There are only 21 of them. Two provinces are dis-
proportionately represented. British Columbia has eight and Manitoba seven.
Two were from Saskatchewan, three from Ontario and one from Alberta.
(As far as is known, the Toronto Juvenile Court has never waived a case,
appealed or otherwise).
The charges were almost all for "serious" crimes if committed by adults.
Ten were charges of murder, three manslaughter, one rape, and 2 lesser
offences involving violence to the person. There was one arson, one obtaining
money by false pretences, one theft and two automobile theft.
Obviously, the age of the "defendant" or alleged juvenile delinquent was
not considered decisive in all cases because in five cases it was not given. In
three others, the age given was only approximate - in all three the child was
over thirteen and somewhere between fourteen and sixteen years. The records
in the report are inconclusive in all instances because the reader is never sure
if the age given is the age at the time of the offence or the time of the
appearance before the court.36 In one case, for instance, the child was
fifteen at the time he was before the court but only thirteen and one-half years
when the offence allegedly occurred. This was probably an unusual case and
we can assume that in most instances the age quoted in the reports is at most,
six months more than the age when the crime was allegedly committed. One
fourteen year old's case was waived. This was Steven Truscott. In six cases
the child was fifteen. There were four seventeen year-olds and one eighteen
year old.
In the light of recent developments in the United States, the scant atten-
tion given to procedure seems remarkable. In only ten cases was procedure
considered an important issue; and in all but two cases the procedural short-
comings were not considered fatal to the waiver order. This observation is not
meant to be a reflection on the operation of the juvenile court in Canada. The
juvenile court philosophy (as expressed by parens patriae and section 38 of
the Juvenile Delinquents Act) need not be compromised for the sake of blind
adherence to formalistic attitudes by the juvenile court judge and the lawyers
appearing before him. The requirements of due process can be applied to
cases in which the juvenile does not admit the delinquency and he and his
parents demand all legal safeguards or in cases in which the seriousness of the
charge may require a full disclosure of the facts and a proper airing of the
36 As to which age is decisive in a court hearing, see Simpson, [1964] 2 C.C.C. 316
at 324.
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issues. The seriousness of the charge should not necessarily result in a
trial; but if this is one of the considerations, then the due process formula
could be employed. In fact, the whole debate on due process is very clearly
raised by waiver cases and, of course, this was the focus of the Kent case
which resulted in some constitutional legal safeguards being applied tojuvenile cases. Some of the earlier cases implicitly (while it was explicit in
Kent) referred to the philosophy of the juvenile court. Finally, and most
importantly for the purposes of this essay, the waiver cases reflect, in a few
isolated insights, the self-concept of the juvenile court judges and the attitudes
of the superior legal courts to the specialized court for children.
Contrary to the view expressed in Shoemaker37 the onus should not havejurisdiction. This seems to be the proper view to take if the law, admittedly
discretionary, found in the Juvenile Delinquents Act (s. 2(h) ) confers power
on the juvenile court judge to hear all cases where a child under a specified
age has allegedly committed an act criminal in an adult court under federal or
provincial legislation.
The question of onus in waiver cases is not raised very often. Judge
Wallace in Simpson 8 (one of the most enlightened judgments on waiver)
takes the view that his judicial discretion is unfettered; although, he implies
that he may have been faced with a more difficult decision if the Crown had
been actively seeking transfer of the case. Judge Wallace goes to great pains
to take every relevant factor into account before exercising his discretion;
some of the other cases give the impression that a long citation-studded
discussion of the ephemeral subject of discretion was more important than the
concrete reasons for exercising that discretion.3 9
Due process seems disproportionately important to the United States
Supreme Court; the concept should certainly be honoured by the juvenile
courts and the higher courts which review the exercise of their powers. In
many respects, the problem of waiver is the true test of a juvenile court.
Waiver goes to the very heart of the role to be played by a juvenile court. If a
juvenile court unnecessarily transfers cases to the adult court, it is not protect-
ing children; it may well be bowing to the retributive instincts of the public
and may also be sacrificing a child to a brutalising adult penal system.
The survey of the waiver cases presents an encapsulated history of the
juvenile court. This study is based only on reported cases and, no doubt, many
other cases were waived in the first twenty years of the juvenile court's
existence.
The juvenile court escaped criticism by higher courts for the first one or
two decades of its life. The first waiver case in this survey was reported
twenty-three years after the passage of the Juvenile Delinquents Act; Rex v.
37 [1966] 3 C.C.C. 79.
38 See n. 36, supra.
39 e.g. Shoemaker, n. 37, supra; and Re Regina v Arbuckle, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 380.
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H.40 came before the Saskatchewan King's Bench in 1931. The appeal against
transfer to the adult court was unsuccessful. The reasons for the transfer
were the factors which became stereotyped in the ensuing years. The Saskat-
chewan King's Bench used the catch-phrases which have become all too
common. The court talked of the interests of justice, questioned the possibility
of a juvenile court giving a juvenile a fair trial. The court also decided that
the juvenile (who was charged with arson) should be tried by a magistrate
with legal training and by a jury if thought necessary. The court noted that
the Juvenile Delinquents Act did not envisage exclusive jurisdiction for the
juvenile court and felt the waiver order advisable when the juvenile's guilt
was "strenuously denied". The decision is noteworthy because it only
mentions these cliches and because it gives almost no thought to the juvenile
as a child lacking discernment. Whether the Saskatchewan King's Bench would
have felt differently if the juvenile had been one, two or three years younger
or had beeh charged with wilful damage or trespass rather than arson, is hard
to say.
A survey of the cases shows one interesting trend in the decisions relating
to the waiver. With one exception, the clich6s of waiver become less frequent
with the passage of time. Some of these clich6s have already been mentioned-
these include the "interests of justice" and the "interests of the community".
One clich6 which has persisted (and which is mentioned, in one form or an-
other, in nine of the cases surveyed although, curiously, not the most recent) is
the "public's right to know". Sometimes this is described (as in four cases) as
the dangers of a private in camera trial and the fact that the juvenile court is
not designed for serious offences and that because of the great public sentiment
against the accused, an open trial in adult court is necessary. Yet this view
was not universal. The British Columbia Juvenile Court in Regina v.
P.M.W.41 was rather ambivalent but it did decide that the murder trial of a
juvenile should not be transferred because that would be "gambling with the
life of a child". The court in that case also observed that the procedures of the
court for children were very flexible and that the court was not meant for
punishment. The court doubted, however, its ability to give a fair trial and
reduced the charge to manslaughter and waived jurisdiction to adult court.
One comment of a general nature has considerable significance for the
historian of the juvenile court. One of the earliest cases, Re L.Y. No. 142 a
decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal decided in favour of waiver partly
because the juvenile court was "experimental". It is only fair to point out
that in this case, in which an eighteen year old was charged with murder, the
Court of Appeal put forward some worthwhile reasons for waiver. These fac-
40 [193112 W.W.R. 917
41 16 W.W.R. 650
42 82 C.C.C. 105.
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tors have become the most frequently used guide in later cases. 48. Obviously,
the "experimental" label was simply a judicial excuse for waiver but the
juvenile court has always (at least in the last forty years) suffered from this
patronising attitude of the regular courts which are often antagonistic to the
rehabilitative approach even in their own adult trials. Some stigma seems to
be suggested by this label - as if the juvenile court was not a success or
could not possibly be a success and was merely a sociological toy which could
be used to deal with the mischievous, as opposed to 'criminal', children. The
legally trained judges presiding over the superior court took a suspicious
attitude towards the juvenile court because of that court's flirtation with the
social and behavioural sciences. In the recent case of Simpson,44 where the
fifteen year old was charged with murder which he had allegedly committed
when he was thriteen and one half years old, the court held that although the
juvenile court was experimental, a proper trial could still be conducted by the
juvenile court. The juvenile court judge's remarks have a slightly defensive
(or is it ironic?) flavour:
I have considered the fact that the Juvenile and Family Court is, as has
been termed by one judgment, an "experimental Court", and that it may be said
to have no settled practice and that trials take place in camera. The Crown
Attorney and defence counsel here are able and experienced. I am certain that
with their assistance the practice to be followed in any such trial would be
proper, and that the interest of the accused would be amply protected. The
privacy of the trial would be in the interest of the child provided he can be
assured of a fair trial. Privacy might be an element prompting a decision to
proceed by way of indictment if public interest or sentiment were strongly against
the child, or demanded an open trial by indictment. It is evident from the
information given to me by counsel that this is not the case here, and that a
cross-section of the community is here prepared to give evidence if this Court
will proceed with the matter.45
43 (a) the age of the child.
(b) the Juvenile Court has no machinery nor settled procedure for trying so
serious a charge as murder. The system in that Court is designed for lighter
offences.
(c) The advantages of a private or secluded trial are offset by the danger of
such a system and trial.
(d) The great safeguards of settled practice in Criminal Courts before a jury,
under the scrutiny of the public, are established and must be followed in the
ordinary Courts. This ensures to the accused a fair and open trial.
(e) The case is to be considered on the same footing as one in which public-
sentiment was strongly against the accused. On that footing, the ordinary
Courts are safer than an experimental one such as a Juvenile Court.
(f) On the foregoing points (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), the experienced Juvenile
and Family Court Judge might hold the honest opinion that the transfer
is for the good of the child.
(g) The "interests of the community" demand nothing less and nothing more
than that the juvenile be given a fair trial. To that end, the community has
a right to know how that trial is to be conducted; they do know that such
a trial is ensured in the ordinary Courts, but they cannot know it will be in
the Juvenile Court where procedure is undefined or not settled, where the
trial is in camera, and where the Judge generally interrogates the accused,
where there is no benefit of jury or anything corresponding to that ancient
safeguard:
from Re L.Y. (No.)), 82 C.C.C. 105
44 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 316
45 Id at 324.
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In Sawchuk,46 the Manitoba Queen's Bench, in a case of a seventeen
year old charged with discharging of a firearm causing bodily harm, upheld an
appeal refusing to waive the case. The court held that it was no longer
necessary to refer to the juvenile court as experimental. The remarks of the
Manitoba superior court were also enlightened on other issues.
Of the twenty-three cases found in the reports, on thirteen occasions the
decision to transfer to the adult courts was upheld. Only one of these cases
involved a decisive procedural point while in the ten cases where the juvenile
court retained jurisdiction, the reasons for the decision were basically pro-
cedural in three of the ten.
What were the major factors in enabling the courts to decide on transfer
or retention by the juvenile court? As mentioned earlier, the "public's right to
know" was mentioned as a major factor in nine of the cases and only in a
third of these was the transfer refused. (Of these three cases, one was auto-
mobile theft,47 one was manslaughter, 48 and one was murder.49) In Re Rex v.
D.P.P., the Manitoba Queen's Bench held that an acquittal by a jury is more
for the good of the accused than a trial in camera before a single judge of any
any court. The court was "unable to accept counsel's opinion that the good
of the accused is inferentially paramount as against the interests of the
community". 5 ' A related reason found in four of these cases was the dangers of
a private trial. Little justification is given for these beliefs; is it distrust of the
abilities of lay judges, of the injustices which will be perpetrated when the
public is not watching or the need for the trial to be used as a morality play for
and by the community at large? These reasons of a socio-cultural nature
seem to be very ephemeral. They offer little solid basis for the decision to
transfer. Most courts were unable to offer anything more concrete than a
thinly disguised retribution (to put the harshest interpretation on their refusal
to leave the juvenile in the court created for him) or a vague hunch that the
morality play of the adult court trial must have its full presentation before a
public audience. There is little or no discussion in these cases of the psychic
harm to the child from the influence of an adult court - one of the
primary reasons for establishing a court for children in the first place. A
happy exception to this is the judgment in Simpson 2 where, after taking
into account the factors set out by Dysart J. in Re L.Y.58 , Judge Wallace also
considered the mental state of the youth, the need to take the youth into
custody if processed in adult court, the need for expediting of the trial, the
interruption in schooling, and the strain which a public trial would impose
48 1. C.R.N.S. 139
47 R. v. Miller, 132 C.C.C. 349
48 Regina v. M., [1964] 2 C.C.C. 135
49 R. v. Liefso, 46 C.R. 103
50 92 C.C.C. 282, alfl-med without written reasons by Manitoba Court of Appeal at
93 C.C.C. 159.
51 92 C.C.C. 282 at 284.
52 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 316
53 See n.43, supra
1969]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
on Simpson and his foster parents. It must also be remembered that Simpson
was being tried in a relatively small community (viz North Bay, Ontario) on
a charge of murdering his father.
One or two cases make reference to the need for a full airing of the
legal issues (including defences) which, presumably, could only be carried out
in adult court, e.g. Regina v. P.M.W.54 and Regina v. Cline,5 5 and that the
court was not designed for serious offences (which would presumably, attract
sophisticated legal arguments) e.g. Re L. Y.56 Penological or correctional
factors only emerge on two occasions; in Re L.Y.,5 7 the specious point is made
that private, in camera, trials are only likely to "stimulate crime" among
juveniles. On another occasion, R. v. Pagee,58 the point was made that one of
the basic considerations was the type of treatment needed for the youth. Little
thought was given to the answer to this problem but, in Pagee, the court used
it in a negative way to decide on transfer; i.e. the court decided whether the
juvenile was likely to be deterred by disposition (or further referral) to train-
ing school as opposed to a prison term. The great fallacy in this is that the first
offender in adult court is likely to receive probation unless the admirable
procedure of keeping juvenile records secret is violated. The relative merits of
juvenile and adult correctional institutions were also discussed in Trodd0
where the youth allegedly committed a breaking and entering. The decision
of the juvenile judge to transfer the case was upheld by the British Columbia
Supreme Court. The evidence before the juvenile court was highly suspect, if
not in content, at least in the form of its presentation. A police sergeant
acting as Crown Counsel told the court of previous adjudications of delin-
quency (admittedly some of which had been made by the same judge) and
of charges pending in other jurisdictions. A probation officer gave his opinion
that the juvenile had "wholly exhausted the resources available to a Juvenile
Court Judge and ...that, in his opinion, the juvenile needed the control
available in an adult institution. ' 60 A psychiatrist submitted a written report
which also recommended an adult institution with "a very structured setting"
where discipline would be an important factor and where "the constant
wrong of escaping could be erased from his mind (after realizing that he
could not escape) and hopefully allow him to learn a trade and change his
sense of values and habits."61 The psychiatrist recommended that later the
boy should be transferred to a treatment centre such as Warrendale in
Ontario where he "could be allowed to continue his emotional and physical
growth in a healthy atmosphere conductive to a proper development, con-
structive goals, and allowing him to mature along proper lines and develop a
54 16 W.W.R. 650
55 [1964] 2 C.C.C. 38
56 Re L.Y. (No. 1), 82 C.C.C. 105
57 Of course, there may be more merit in the notion that reports of juvenile court
hearings, anonymous or otherwise, should be published in daily newspapers for their
deterrent effect.
58 41 W.W.R. 159
59 [1966] 3 C.C.C. 367
,O6ld., at 370
61 Id.
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sense of responsibility and a better sense of values". 62 Whatever the merits
or feasibility of these submissions, the youth's right to be treated fairly by the
legal process does not seem to have been considered by either court. Even
if the boy could be taught a trade and then transferred to an institution such
as Warrendale, the court's preoccupation with treatment may seem admirable
but, in fact, it is less humane as it not only invades the youth's rights but also
makes him a victim of a system which has inadequate facilities for problem
cases. On the other hand, the appeal court judge must be applauded for look-
ing beyond the mere forms of trial in the two courts and discussing the welfare
of the child after adjudication, whatever form it might take. The unfortunate
fact is that the failure to help Trodd tends to corroborate the critics of the
juvenile courts and reform schools. One wonders whether Justice Fortas is not
correct when he says: That many children before the juvenile court get the
worst instead of the best of the two worlds of adult punishment and flexible
procedures.
If one thing is clear from the various cases decided under the Juvenile
Delinquents Act, it is the unanimous opinion that that piece of legislation is
poorly drawn:63 This is certainly suggested by judicial criticisms of the
"best interests of the child" in s. 38, "the interests of the community" in the
waiver cases and "similar form of vice" in the glue sniffing cases. 64 Perhaps
there is a simple reply to these criticisms; any attempt to carry out a positivis-
tic analysis of a social welfare statute is going to lead to an impossible situation.
Similarly, any attempt to redefine "juvenile delinquency" in terms wider than
"junior" criminal offences and a redrafting of "best interests of the child" may
well lead to difficulties.
One of the most perplexing cases is Attorney-General of British Columbia
v. Smith.65 The British Columbia Court of Appeal's several majority and
dissenting judgments, particularly the latter, add something to the debate but
the decision of the Supreme Court is, unfortunately, a typical judgment - one
judge wrote a rather colourless decision adopting the majority view of the
court below, adding little to our understanding of the juvenile court; the
remainder of the court remained silent.
Magistrate G. 0. Stewart of Prince George, British Columbia, one of
the most enlightened and humane magistrates in the country, convicted Smith
of a speeding charge and fined him under the province's Highway Traffic Act.
Smith appealed the conviction on the grounds that he should have been
treated as a juvenile which he certainly was under British Columbia law,
although he was able under B.C. law to hold a driver's licence.66. The British
62Id.
63 See, however, the commentary by the draftsman of the Act,
64See, Parker, Glue Sniffing, 11 CRIM. L.Q. 175
65 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 311 (B.C.C.A.); [1969] 1 C.C.C. 244
(S.C.C.)
66 The Minister of Justice's Report on Juvenile Delinquency recommends a uniform
age for delinquency throughout Canada. See also the Report of the Ontario Legislature's
Select Committee on Youth which discusses the age differences applying to such matters
as driving, drinking, voting, etc.
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Columbia Attorney-General, opposed by the Attorney-General of Canada,
argued that the Juvenile Delinquents Act was ultra vires to the extent that it
required prosecutions under provincial statutes to be within the exclusivejurisdiction of the juvenile court. In effect, Smith was arguing that it was
a case of illegal waiver.
Perhaps it is fatal to ask a Canadian court to consider a major policy
issue if it is likely to become embroiled in interpretations of Section 91 of the
British North America Act. Such exercises do not lead to an intelligent,
in-depth study of the issues but, instead, lengthy periods of navel contempla-
tion. The majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal certainly treated the case in
that way.
The Attorney-General of British Columbia argued that the Federal
Parliament, in attempting to pre-empt the province's power to prosecute
traffic offenders, was intruding upon a "forbidden field under the guise or
cloak of enacting criminal law by what in reality, in its pith and substance, is
only a procedural statute". 67 Lord J. A. rejected this view because the
Federal Parliament (in 1907) had obviously taken the view that problems of
child crime had "reached such proportions that it was in the public interest
to treat those problems from a national point of view". 68 His Lordship took
the view that the Juvenile Delinquents Act had created the "offence" of
"delinquency" and provided a "totally different method of dealing with ajuvenile offender" 69 and should override any provincial legislation.
Both Lord J. A. and Bull I. A. joined support for their views in the
remarks of Locke J. in Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. TheQueen where the Canadian Supreme Court judge said:
The power to legislate in relation to criminal law is not restricted in my
opinion, to defining offences and providing penalties for their commission. Thepower of Parliament extends to legislation designed for the prevention of crime
as well as to punishing crime.70
The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal were preoccupied
with occupying the field for the Federal Parliament. Bull I A. describes the
Juvenile Delinquents Act as a "complete and comprehensive criminal case
for children". His Lordship does not speak of the peculiar nature of the
"crime" of delinquency or the policy of the Act found in Section 38. This
attitude facilitates his attempt to distinguish child welfare legislation from laws
relating to juvenile delinquency which he sees as the "very essence of criminal
law". 71 He further explained this distinction:
Although the responsibility of the State for the care of people in distress,including the care and protection of children, whether neglected or not, lies withinthe provincial jurisdiction as was determined in Reference re Adop~tion Act,
etc., [1938] 3 D.L.R. 497, [1938] S.C.R. 398, 71 C.C.C.110, the objects and
purposes of the statutes therein considered are quite different from those of the
Juvenile Delinquents Act. In the former the objects are directed to the control or
67 [19661 2 C.C.C. 338
68 Id., at 333.
69 Id., at 336
70 2D.L.R. (2d.) 11 at lq.
71 [1966] 2 C.C.C. 338 at 342.
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alleviation of social conditions, the proper education and training of children,
and the care and protection of people in distress including neglected children. In
the latter, the object is clearly to govern the apprehension, punishment, proper
care and guidance of children who are offenders against the laws of the com-
munity of whatever type and by whoever enacted to the end of the over-all
prevention of crimeT2
Davey J. A. took a different view. He relied on the pith and substance test
and decided that the Juvenile Delinquents Act was an act relating to the
"protection and welfare of children", 73 because the Act was primarily inter-
ested in the way in which children were treated when they committed infrac-
tions of the law. He further held that the Federal Parliament obviously did not
intend to provide a common standard for dealing with a national problem
because the "condition of delinquency" could vary from one province or city
to another. Furthermore, he argued, many provincial laws applying to
behavior by children could hardly be said to be measures of crime prevention
envisaged by Bull J. and Lord J. A. Norris J. A. agreed with his fellow
dissenter that the wording of sections 2 (1) (h) and 3 (2) of the Juvenile
Delinquents Act made it perfectly clear that the "offence" of delinquency is a
"mere facade" because the latter section wants the child not be treated as an
offender but as in the condition of delinquency. Norris J. A. was the onlyjudge who mentioned, although fleetingly, section 38 of the Act.
Ironically, not a single judge of the British Columbia Court of Appeal
makes reference to the juvenile court. Perhaps this is understandable in the
dissenting judgments which are left in the inconsistent position of endorsing
the philosophy of the juvenile court as expressed in sections 2, 3, and 38 of
the Juvenile Delinquents Act, while seeking to give the provincial magistrates'
court jurisdiction. On the other hand, what opinion would the majority have
expressed if asked to comment on the constitutional pith and substance of thejuvenile court. Before reaching a hasty decision, it is well to remember that
head 27 of Section 91 of the British North America Act defines criminal law
as including procedure.
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Canada74 upheld the 3-2
decision of the court below. Fauteux J.'s judgment adds very little. His Lord-
ship does set out the pertinent sections of the Juvenile Delinquents Act,
including the Preamble which states:
Whereas it is inexpedient that youthful offenders should be classed or dealt
with as ordinary criminals, the welfare of the community demanding that they
should on the contrary be guarded against association with crime and criminals,
and should be subjected to such wise care, treatment and control as will tend
to check their evil tendencies and to strengthen their better instincts.
He also refers to the juvenile court itself, describing the privacy and infor-
mality of its hearings. Yet, the learned judge is still able to agree with Bull
J. A.'s interpretation of Reference re Adoption Act that the legislation's pith
and substance is very different from that of the Juvenile Delinquents Act.
72 Id.
73 Id., at 341.
74 [19691 1 C.C.C. 244.
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The most remarkable statement in his judgment is his oblique reference
to waiver although he does not specifically refer to transfer of a juvenile case
to adult court. He said:
A very wide discretion is given to the judge, under the Act, and it is
significant that, in the exercise of such discretion, the interest of the child is not
the sole question to consider. On the contrary, the matters which, in principle,
must receive the attention of the judge and which he must try to conciliate are
the child's interest or own good, the community's best interest and the proper
administration of justice. This, I think, qualifies the nature of the protection
which the Act is meant to give to juveniles alleged or found to be delinquents
and supports the proposition that the Act is not legislation in relation to
protection and welfare of children within the meaning envisaged in the Adoption
Act case, supra.75
One would have thought that the reverse was more likely to be true. Waiver
cases are quite atypical (and form a negligible percentage of all delinquency
charges) and accentuate the non-criminal quality of the cases which
remain in the juvenile court. Of course, we must not misinterpret Fauteux
. He is certainly not advocating the transfer of cases to adult courts. On the
contrary, the very essence of his judgment is the retention by the juvenile
court of trial of traffic violations by juveniles. In the present context, this is
hardly the point. The disquieting aspect of the Smith case is that, once again,
the appeal courts seem to have shown a sad lack of understanding for the
true quality of the juvenile court. The remarks of Fauteux J. to the effect that
the Juvenile Delinquents Act is a "criminal" statute may have simply been a
constitutional skirmish but, on the other hand, this characterization of the
Act may well return to haunt the juvenile court. If this is to be taken as an
indication of the future for the juvenile court, then the efforts of those who
believe that the court should spend less time adjudicating delinquency and
more time on community prevention programs, family counselling, better
liason with the schools and the overall application of the original aims of the
court will be sorely disappointed. If the appeal courts fail to understand
the social welfare philosophy of the juvenile court, in the Smith case, then the
children's court may well suffer other incursions on its powers.
Finally, this article was postponed so that the latest volumes of the
report of the Family Law Project (sponsored by the Ontario Law Reform
Commission) could be examined and commented upon. Frankly, the wait
was hardly worthwhile. Although Volume X (the most pertinent volume
in the present context) describes such topics as family counselling and day
care for children, the discussion of the juvenile court itself is almost purely
descriptive and limited to administrative detail. The recommendations for
"reform" are limited to the two alternative schemes for upgrading the status of
the judges. Both schemes seem to be quite impractical.
Admittedly, the writers of the report make the worthwhile, but far from
original, suggestion that all family matters (including divorce) should be in
the hands of the Provincial Court (Family Division). On the question of the
future juvenile court as a tribunal for dealing with children and "solving"
their behavioural and social problems as soon as possible, the report makes no
concrete recommendations.
75 Id, at 246.
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The Family Law Project and the decisions of the appeal courts described
above are clear indications of the misconceptions surrounding the court. The
Family Law Project, as much as the appellate courts, seem to be convinced
that the judicial treatment of the juvenile has some intrinsic merit. While the
Project sees various activities as ancillary and no doubt vital to the juvenile
court's function (which were totally ignored by the appeal courts) the
Supreme Court of Canada and other superior courts of the provinces seemed
unable to look beyond the legalistic questions. The philosophy underlying
the Juvenile Delinquents Act was seldom mentioned. Indeed, the juvenile
court, as a unique institution, was usually ignored; instead, the welfare of the
child as could be expressed through the services of the specialized court
was seldom considered. The repressive qualities of the criminal process
seem to have taken pre-eminence over the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile
court. Why should this be? Why have the ordinary courts refused to define
and understand the philosophy of the juvenile court? Perhaps the real reason
is that the adult courts believed the assertion that the children's court is
"experimental" and too avant garde for a criminal law process which is based
on retribution. The simple fact is that the appeal courts do not believe in the
system of juvenile justice - unless it is an innocuous case of a mischievous
child performing some trivial act.76
76Two very recent cases give some new insights but have been published too
recently to be included in the above analysis; Regina v. Beeman, (1969) 69 W.W.R. 624
and Regina v. Proctor, (1969) 69 W.W.R. 754.
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